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SOME ECONOMIC INSIGHTS INTO APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS 
DOCTRINE: WALKER-THOMAS REVISITED
JAMES W. BOWERS*
I. INTRODUCTION: HUMAN HETEROGENEITY, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST,
AND CONTRACTING
Human heterogeneity motivates contracts. We are all individuals, dif-
fering from each other in our natural and economic resource endowments, 
our tastes, talents, wants and aspirations. Heterogeneity creates opportuni-
ties to capture social gains from trading, by, among other ways, creating 
competitive advantages and disadvantages. I love flowers but find spading 
my flower garden exhausting because I am uncoordinated and weak. You 
are strong and skillful with a shovel, and can spade in a couple of hours 
what it would take me a day or two to complete. Our differences then likely 
lead to a mutually advantageous contract for you to spade my garden.
Heterogeneity can also create conflicts of interest. Of course, I might 
spade my own garden, but when I deal with you, like most buyers I desire 
to pay you a low price for the service. You, like most sellers, on the other 
hand, desire higher compensation. We can avoid having to deal with this 
conflict by refusing to contract; the cost of refusal is the loss of potential 
gains from trade that refusal foregoes. We owe contract law partially to our
desire to resolve those conflicts. The basic contract law solves the problems 
of conflicts of interest which heterogeneity produces by enforcing the con-
flict resolutions to which the parties have heterogeneously agreed . Thus, in 
the usual case, no uniform contract rule requires “garden spaders shall be 
paid $15.30 per week” or “$18.00 for each twelve feet of soil cultivation 
adequate to prepare it for zinnia plantings.” Contract law will enforce the 
heterogeneous compensation levels specified by each individual contract. 
Because the traders are heterogeneous, contract rules will be difficult to 
* Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law; Oliver P. Stockwell Professor, Emeritus, Louisiana 
State University Law Center. B.A. 1964, LL.B.1967 Yale. An early version of this project was support-
ed by a research stipend granted by LSU Chancellor, Jack Weiss. I am also grateful for helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts by participants at the UNLV contract law conference, and at an LSU faculty 
workshop. Professor Sarah Jenkins led me to some valuable research material, and provided helpful 
editorial suggestions as well, for which I thank her. That I failed, despite all this assistance, to plug any 
remaining holes, confirms the generality of Murphy’s Law. 
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justify unless they carry out the parties’ own differing interests or resolve 
conflicts among those interests in ways the parties themselves have chosen.
That premise compels suspicion that a concept such as “aberrant con-
tract” is a redundancy. “Aberrant” means deviating from what is normal or 
from a standard.1 Contracts exploit, and contract law works to assuage the 
effects of human idiosyncrasy and uniqueness. Contracting permits traders 
to form personalized responses to their opportunities to make gains from 
exchanges, as well as to resolve their conflicts when they use contracts. I 
may order from you, and you might agree to sell me a chartreuse pickup 
truck with purple and orange polka dots. That aberrant transaction captures 
the very essence of why we desire to make contracts and need contract law 
to enforce them. The definition of aberrant developed for use in this sym-
posium simply takes certain common credit-granting devices, even though 
they are quite widespread and commonly used and in a move toward new-
speak assigns them this label.
Ex ante agreements do not actually solve all parties’ conflicts of inter-
est. The conflicts arise only post contract, and parties may not have fore-
seen before concluding their agreement. Ex ante, the conflict—deemed so 
unlikely to arise—may not seem worth the costs of the resolution. Another 
function of the contract law, accordingly, has been to resolve the unfore-
seen conflicts that only become salient to the parties ex post. A substantial 
fraction of the body of contract law consists of so-called “default” contract 
terms that answer the question of how to answer a conflict-of-interest ques-
tion not solved by the express agreement itself.
This study seeks to use this intellectual foundation to examine a par-
ticular set of long lived, but recently abandoned, contract rules for certain 
species of transacting parties, what has long been classified by lawyers as 
the problem of application of payments.
II. THE APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM
Payments satisfy and discharge debt obligations. After receiving pay-
ment, a creditor will no longer have any legal recourse available because of 
the discharge. Debt obligations may arise in a single transaction, the arche-
type being a loan advanced by a bank to the signer of a note in its favor. 
However, small partial payments made to the bank on account of that loan 
transaction will leave outstanding loan balances, for which the creditor 
bank can sue to recover. This, the most elementary law school hypothetical, 
seems obvious even to non-lawyers.
1. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 21 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds., 2nd ed. 1989).
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Some debt obligations, on the other hand, grow from multiple transac-
tions between the debtor and a single creditor. Typical examples include 
multiple meals charged on a single bankcard, or multiple charges from our 
cell phone providers for several phone calls. The patient makes several 
visits to the same doctor, or has several conferences with her lawyer, and 
owes additional sums for each visit or conference. Every month we receive 
our bankcard or telephone account statement, or our doctor’s or lawyer’s 
bills detailing several separate charges made for several purchases of goods 
or services during that period. Each meal, call, doctor visit or lawyer charge 
we might say, created a separate debt obligation. Typically, however, a 
monthly or periodic statement of account bills for the aggregate amount of 
the separate charges for each doctor or lawyer visit, phone call, or credit 
card-swipe.
Even though in the bankcard and telephone bill cases there really were 
multiple credit transactions (meals charged, office visits or phone calls), the 
debtor has no obvious systematic gain from choosing which transactions 
should be discharged by a partial payment should the debtor choose to 
make one. Nor does the creditor stand to capture systematic gains from any 
other choices. The parties’ interests simply do not conflict. As in the arche-
typical bank loan, partial payments will still leave balances due and owed. 
The creditor doctor, lawyer, bankcard or phone company will rarely have 
an occasion to care which charges are satisfied by the partial payment, but 
will instead view the unpaid balance as a single remaining debt for which 
they expect to receive future payment. Typically, the debtor mailing in the 
partial payment is also indifferent about which charges she wants deemed 
paid in full, and which she prefers to remain outstanding and unpaid. She 
remains obligated for the unpaid balance in any case.
Cases arise, however, in which the obligations created by each trans-
action carry differing legal remedies. Suppose, for example, the separate 
credit charges making up the total debt bear interest but at differing rates. 
In that case, a welfare-maximizing debtor prefers that the creditor apply the 
partial payment to satisfy the highest interest debts first, leaving only the 
low rate debts unpaid. The creditor, for obvious reasons, rationally harbors 
the reverse preferences. This case illustrates a real conflict of interest about 
how to apply partial payments. If the parties’ express contract does not 
resolve the conflict, the courts must resort to the default provisions of our 
basic background contract law to settle the dispute.
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III. WALKER-THOMAS, AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE.
Another context where application of partial payments might matter 
occurs when the items purchased on credit become collateral, subject to a 
“purchase money” security interest securing the unpaid portion of the pur-
chase price. Some pieces of collateral will be more valuable than others. 
The debtor will want partial payments applied to the valuable collateral, 
permitting her to retain those items, leaving the creditor with the right to 
repossess only the collateral worth relatively less. The creditor will have 
the opposite preference for how to apply the partial payments. He wants 
partial payments applied first to debts secured by low value collateral, leav-
ing him with the right to repossess the highest valued. One might expect 
the contract to settle this conflict as well. If the contract does not expressly 
deal with the application of partial payments on account, the common law, 
not unexpectedly, developed a set of default provisions which would gov-
ern absent the parties own contractual resolution. This study argues that in 
deciding whether to enforce an application of payments clause contracted 
for by the parties, a court ought also to consider the impact of that common 
law default doctrine. Consider a famous case in which that inquiry should 
have but never was made.
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company2 is probably the case 
that jumps first into a student’s mind upon hearing the phrase “aberrant 
contracts.” The case introduced the last two generations of American law 
students3 to the most innovative provision in modern American contract 
law: the unconscionability defense.4 The defense was first promulgated in 
this form to American law as Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the 
2. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
3. In a fair sample of popular and long-lived law school contracts casebooks, the case either 
leads the unit on unconscionability or is prominently printed and featured in that unit. See, e.g., STEVEN 
J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 244 (Thompson/West ed., 3d ed. 2006); JOHN P. DAWSON 
ET AL., CONTRACTS CASES AND COMMENTS 693 (Thompson/Foundation Press ed., 9th ed. 2008); E.
ALLEN FARNSWORTH, ET AL., CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 497 (Thompson Reuters/Foundation 
Press ed., 7th ed. 2008); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 34 (Thomp-
son/West ed., 8th ed. 2006); CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW CASES AND 
MATERIALS 586 (Aspen Publishers ed., 6th ed. 2007); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN 
CONTRACT LAW 538 (Foundation Press ed., 6th ed. 2003); ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS,
CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 56 (LexisNexis ed., 3d ed. 2003).
4. Modern unconscionability doctrine was first adopted by the enactment of section 2-302 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code applying it to contracts for the sale of goods. Subsequently the doctrine was 
extended to contracts generally. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1981).
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contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the appli-
cation of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable re-
sult.5
The subject of the contract clause Walker-Thomas found potentially 
unconscionable governed the application of a series of monthly installment 
payments to multiple debts.6 This study is the first peek using economic 
theory to develop an understanding of the common law default application 
of payments doctrine. Walker-Thomas provides a prototypical illustration.
The court in Walker-Thomas overlooked the effect of knocking an un-
conscionable clause out of the contract—it left the parties in the common 
law default position. Economic theory predicts that under such default 
terms, consumers like plaintiff Williams will likely be worse off. So 
viewed, the offending contract clause was relatively more fair than its de-
tractors have claimed.
In Walker-Thomas, two consumer-appellants, Ms. Williams and Mr. 
and Mrs. Thorpe appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, from District of Columbia Court of Appeals judgments.7 Their 
cases had been consolidated for appeal. The District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals had affirmed trial judgments granting the plaintiff furniture store 
writs of replevin to repossess household goods purchased by the consumers 
on credit from the store.8 The plaintiffs pledged repossessed household 
items as collateral to secure the unpaid balances of their purchase prices.9
The legal aid office in D.C. represented both appellant consumers, one of 
whose lawyers later conceded that its goal was to shape the matter into a 
5. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002) (emphasis added).
6. 350 F.2d at 450 (“Because the trial court and the appellate court did not feel that enforcement 
could be refused, no findings were made on the possible unconscionability of the contracts in these 
cases. Since the record is not sufficient for our deciding the issue as a matter of law, the cases must be 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.”).
7. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. App. 1964).
8. Id. at 916.
9. Technically, the D.C. Circuit found the household goods were the subject of lease/purchase 
contracts under which payments took the form of rent payable until the purchase price had been entirely 
amortized at which time title to the purchased items would pass to the purchaser. Walker-Thomas, 350 
F.2d at 447. Under the then existing law the contracts would have been characterized not as leases but 
rather as conditional sales. The classic description, history and analysis of that device are found in 1 
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, ch. 3 (1965). Under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, which had been adopted by Congress to govern in the District, but to take 
effect only at a date after the trial of this case, the contracts would have likewise been re-characterized 
as creating Article 9 security interests. U.C.C. § 1-201 (2011):
Whether a transaction creates a lease or a security interest is determined by the facts of each case; 
however, a transaction creates a security interest if the consideration the lessee is to pay the lessor for 
the right to possession and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the lease not subject to 
termination by the lessee, and [there follows a list of other provisions which ask whether the goods have 
expected value after the expiration of the lease term, and which provide the lessee with the opportunity 
to capture that value for nominal consideration.
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test case on a pure question of law.10 Many factual details in the underlying 
cases were, accordingly, unaddressed. Fortunately, for researchers, that 
lawyer wrote an article shortly after the case, which contains information 
not recoverable from the submissions of the parties, some of which are 
generally available from the National Archives.11 From the material avail-
able, this study begins by reconstructing the events that led to the appeal.
The Thorne and Williams cases were tried separately. The repos-
sessing seller was the same in both cases, as were the terms of the various 
credit contracts both consumers signed so the cases were consolidated on 
appeal.12 The first, for whose name the case became famously remem-
bered, was that of defendant Ora-Lee Williams. Ms. Williams signed four-
teen separate credit contracts over a five-year period.13 The size of her 
monthly relief payment ($218) was known to the furniture store because 
the name of her social worker and the amounts of the monthly relief checks 
were annotated on the contract for a stereo she purchased as well as several 
of the other instruments she signed.14 There was some disagreement about 
what to make of these annotations, however. The furniture company’s brief 
suggests that the relief check may not have been Ms. Williams’ sole source 
of income.15 Apparently, from those annotations alone, however the D.C. 
Court of Appeals concluded that the relief check was the sole means for 
both herself and her seven children.16
Whether or not Ms. Williams was living only on the relief check may 
have been less important to the defendant furniture company than one 
might suppose, however. Other researchers have examined the furniture 
store’s business methods, which included sending a collection agent to the 
homes of debtors on the expected delivery day of the relief checks.17 The 
10. Pierre S. Dostert, Appellate Restatement of Unconscionability: Civil Legal Aid at Work, 54 
A.B.A.J. 1183, 1185 (1968) (“We did not demand a jury trial in these cases since we felt it preferable to 
strive for precedent in terms of law rather than isolated findings of fact.”). In any case, U.C.C. section 
2-302 supports a conclusion that unconscionability will never be a jury question. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 4 
(2011).
11. Dostert, supra note 10, at 1183.
12. Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 447
13. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 915 (D.C. 1964).
14. Id.
15. See Brief for Appellee at 25, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965) (Nos. 18,604 & 18,605) (“Mrs. Williams . . . attempted to create the illusion of a poor inno-
cent person of limited education, on relief with seven (7) children - not once disclosing the source and 
amount of additional income, reference to which has been obviously omitted in her brief at page 9, but 
which is stated clearly in her testimony. (Tr.54).”). The various appellate briefs cited hereinafter are on 
file with the author and the Chicago-Kent Law Review.
16. Walker-Thomas, 198 A.2d at 915.
17. See David I. Greenberg, Easy Terms, Hard Times: Complaint Handling in the Ghetto, in NO
ACCESS TO LAW: ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM 380, 382 (Laura Nader ed., 
1980).
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agent came prepared to cash the relief check, retaining the amount of the 
monthly payment, but would turn over the balance in currency to the debt-
ors.18 The effort to find a check-cashing service in the ghetto where this 
process functioned was not inconsequential; as were the risks of mugging, 
since outlaws were aware of the date the checks arrived as well. Other 
sources of income whose arrival dates were less predictable would have 
been less relevant to the creditor using this very expensive collection tech-
nique to deal with these high risk borrowers.
In his American Bar Association Journal article describing the case, 
Ms. Williams’ lawyer discloses that the replevin writ in her case authorized 
the seizure of twenty-two items or sets of household goods.19 Out of order-
ly habit, the lawyers applying for the writ were likely to have listed those 
items in order of their acquisition, and that order conforms to what eco-
nomic theory predicts about relationships such as that between Ms. Wil-
liams and the furniture store. Consumers’ counsel sought a decision on a 
pure question of law, so his case did not stress factual details about the 
underlying transactions.20 The furniture company’s theory was that all of 
the purchased items served as collateral for a single consolidated aggregate 
debt, and so its brief does not discuss the number or details of the separate 
underlying credit purchases either. The initial transaction between Williams 
and the store, the signing of a printed form on January 22, 1957, was for 
the credit purchase of two pair of draperies for a stated consideration of 
$12.95.21 Another set of scholars who apparently had access to the trial 
record in the case describe the initial transaction only as “item one” but 
report its purchase almost a year later on December 23, 1957, for an initial 
purchase price of $45.65.22 The first items listed in the writ of replevin, 
presumably because they were the earliest purchases, were one wallet, two 
pairs of draperies, one apron set, and one potholder set.23 Since fourteen 
contracts were executed, but the replevin writ lists twenty-two separate 
items or sets of items to be seized, multiple items must have been pur-
chased under some of the contracts. Since each succeeding contract consol-
idated the previously owed debt with the new credit extended for the new 
purchases, it is not surprising trying to link each item of collateral with its 
18. Id.
19. Dostert, supra note 10, at 1183 (listing items).
20. Id. at 1185 (“We did not demand a jury in these cases since we felt it preferable to strive for 
precedent in terms of law rather than isolated findings of fact.”).
21. Id. at 1183.
22. Robert H. Skilton & Orrin C. Halstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1477 (1965).
23. Dostert, supra note 10, at 1184.
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underlying transaction is confusing. The consumer’s counsels’ legal strate-
gy, however, pivoted on the order in which items were purchased.24 They 
emphasized their clients’ subjective understandings that once having made 
a sufficiently large number of payments, title to the earliest purchased mer-
chandise should have passed to them.25 As we shall soon discuss, however, 
this strategy was unfavorable to their clients’ interests in important re-
spects,26 so it is understandable that they were imprecise in describing each 
transaction. Reasonable conclusions about what actually occurred are justi-
fiable because the case represents predictable behaviors and the pattern in 
the case confirms those predictions.
At the onset of a credit relationship, a profit-maximizing credit seller 
will predictably minimize the risk it assumes for credit extended to impov-
erished consumers by selling only inexpensive items. Once the debtor 
proves she can, and reliably will, make the payments she promised, the 
creditor ought to be willing to increase its credit exposure by agreeing, later 
in the relationship, to sell larger and more expensive items. Our assumption 
that the replevin writ lists the items of claimed collateral in their acquisition 
order bears out this economic prediction. Reliable performance under a 
series of credit transactions creates an economic asset for the consumer, a 
reputation—a form of intangible human relational capital evidenced by an 
increase in the borrowing power, even for impoverished consumers. The 
items listed in the replevin writ, were, in order:27
One wallet




1 pair of draperies
1 2x6 folding bed
1 chest
1 9x12 linoleum rug
2 pairs of curtains
4 sheets
24. See Skilton & Halstad, supra note 22, at 1487 & n.65.
25. The opinion of the D.C. Court of Appeals indicated that the appellants were arguing for a 
“first-in-first-out” application of payments. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 
916 (D.C. 1964). Appellant testified she understood the agreements to mean that when payments on the 
running account were sufficient to balance the amount due on an individual item, the item would be-
come hers. Id. at 915.
26. See infra Part VIII.
27. Dostert, supra note 10, at 1184 n.1.
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1 ws20 portable fan
2 pairs of curtains
1 Royal portable typewriter
2 gun and holster sets (presumably toys)
1 metal bed
1 inner spring mattress
4 chrome kitchen chairs
1 bath mat set
1 set shower curtains
1 Speedqueen washing machine
1 Admiral stereo
The pattern here conforms to our predictions that poor credit risk con-
sumers must first demonstrate their dependability on small extensions of 
credit, but that when they do, creditors will eventually begin to enlarge the 
amount of credit risk they are willing to undertake. Ms. Williams, in fact, 
purchased household goods with an aggregate credit price in the neighbor-
hood of $1500 over a five-year period and successfully made payments 
totaling $1056.28 She was able to purchase the larger and more costly items 
of furniture and appliances only after she had successfully kept her com-
mitments to make the payments on the lower priced items such as aprons, 
potholders, wallets, and curtains.
The Thorne case, consolidated with Ms. Williams’, does not demon-
strate that pattern, but for understandable reasons. Big-ticket items were 
randomly scattered in the presumed purchase order listed in their replevin 
writ, with smaller items.29 The reason, not noted by the D.C. Circuit in its 
opinion, however, could well have been that the Thornes had been custom-
ers of the furniture store for twenty years, not just the five which Ms. Wil-
liams had been a customer.30 Over the first fifteen years, they had 
successfully amortized the debts they accumulated. The Thornes therefore, 
likely entered into the last five years of the consumer/store relationship 
preceding this litigation already possessing the reputation for creditworthi-
ness that Ms. Williams was required to build during that period.
28. Skilton, supra note 22, at 1477.
29. Their writ authorized the seizure of the following, again presumptively, in the order of their 
acquisition: 1 DuMont television, 1 antenna, 1 chenille bedspread, 2 pairs of draperies, 1 Crosley 
refrigerator, 1 7-piece breakfast set, 1 9x12 linoleum rug, 1 embassy antenna, 1 Gibson freezer, 1 
daveno, 2 step tables, 1 cocktail table, 2 table lamps, 1 9x12 living room rug. Dostert, supra note 10, at 
1184 n.2. 
30. Brief for Appellee, supra note 15, at 8 (“For more than twenty years [Thorne] had engaged in 
a course of dealing with appellee.”).
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The courts’ opinions do not discuss the facts in the Thorne appeal, the 
education levels, number of children supported, or which of the items they 
had purchased on credit and actually successfully repossessed, and similar 
personal details that it found relevant in the consolidated matter with Ms. 
Williams. The D.C. Circuit would have been aware, however, that since 
they were represented by the legal aid office, their income level at the time 
of the litigation, although not necessarily at the time the purchases were 
made, would have had to have been low enough to meet that office’s eligi-
bility requirements.
All of the credit purchase contracts signed by Ms. Williams and the 
Thornes contained the following clause:
If I am now indebted to the Company on any prior leases, bills, or ac-
counts, it is agreed that the amount of each periodical installment pay-
ment to be made by me to the Company under this present lease shall be 
inclusive of and not in addition to the amount of each installment pay-
ment to be made by me under such prior leases, bills or accounts; and all 
payments now and hereafter made by me shall be credited pro rata on 
all outstanding leases, bills and accounts due the Company by me at the 
time each such payment is made.31
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion, which supplied the above emphasis to a 
sentence in the contract, has been understood to address that sentence alone 
as raising the suspicion of being unconscionable. The opinion infers from 
that sentence that “as a result, the debt incurred at the time of purchase of 
each item, was secured by the right to repossess all of the items being pur-
chased.”32
The D.C. Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion using strong-
er language:
[E]ach [of the separate credit contracts] contained a long paragraph in 
extremely fine print. One of the sentences in this paragraph [seemingly 
the one emphasized by the D.C. Circuit Court] provided that payments, 
on all purchases after the first purchase, were to be prorated on all pur-
chases then outstanding. Mathematically, this had the effect of keeping a 
balance due on all items until the time balance was completely eliminat-
ed. It meant that title to the first purchase remained in the appellee until 
the fourteenth purchase, made some five years later, was fully paid.33
For purposes of analysis here, I make one other inference from the 
above not discussed by the courts. It seems very likely that once a consum-
er made an initial purchase on credit, they agreed to an initial payment pe-
riod. During that period, the consumer might discover some other want and 
31. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (emphasis 
added).
32. Id.
33. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 915 (D.C. 1964).
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attempt to satisfy it on credit with the store. A new purchase would require 
a new payment period, of course. It is highly likely that the payment period 
for the later items would extend beyond the terminal date of the agreed 
earlier payoff schedules on the previous purchases. Thus, when the contract 
for each later purchase consolidated the later debt with the former, it also 
adopted the payment schedule for the later purchase, which inevitably had 
the effect of extending the payoff period for earlier purchases. This, it 
seems clear, was the intent of the first half of the challenged contract clause 
which provided that going forward from the last purchase, future install-
ment payments would be inclusive of and not in addition to the payments 
promised under previous contracts. The consumer, who had demonstrated 
the ability to make, say weekly payments of $15, could continue to make 
the similar modest payment but over a longer period in order to acquire 
new merchandise. Even if the monthly payments increased somewhat with 
new purchases, the increase would not have been adequate to pay in full for 
both the earlier and later purchases at the time the last payment on the ear-
liest contracts became due. The clear purpose of contractually consolidat-
ing the debts was to enable the consumer to obtain new merchandise while 
continuing to pay both for the older and the newer purchases, with the obli-
gation to pay ceasing only when the payment period for the last purchase 
expired. Another way, then, of looking at the requirement that all fourteen 
contracts be paid off before title to the collateral passed to the consumer, is 
not that it is a mathematical requirement. Rather, the requirement results 
from the consumers’ requests to extend the period for making payments to 
the conclusion of the payment period provided for in the last purchase con-
tract. For the first purchases to have remained unpaid, after a fourteen-
contract cycle, the request to extend the time for nonpayment to last was 
renewed and granted at least thirteen times.
The consumers nevertheless testified that they believed their payments 
would always be credited to the earliest purchases.34 It follows that they 
must have thought when they made new purchases they would not be re-
quired to make any payments on them for some time, because all payments 
would be applied to earlier purchases until they were paid off.35 A contrac-
tual expectation of free use of depreciating collateral, like kitchen furniture 
and appliances, without making any payments on them probably would be 
unreasonable. Indeed, had the consumers’ sufficient market power to have 
34. Id.
35. Id. When several items were purchased at the same time under the same contract, which must 
have been the case with several of them, it is a mystery, for example, whether Ms. Williams thought the 
early payments applied first to the wallet or to the curtains. Id.
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actually imposed such a term on the store, that term would likely be uncon-
scionable itself. If it were unconscionable to apply any part of any future 
payments to satisfy the debt for the latest purchase, it is unlikely new sales 
would ever be made until the early items were completely paid off. Perhaps 
the world is a better place if the law makes Ms. Williams wait to buy a 
washing machine until she pays off her potholders, even if she opted to 
postpone the final payment date for the potholders at the time she bought 
the washer so she could obtain the washer earlier. That determination, 
however, would completely wipe out the value of the relational reputational 
asset her performance on previous promises had created.36 Since borrowing 
power they have worked hard to create is likely to be significantly im-
portant to poor consumers, it seems, at minimum, ungenerous for the law to 
take it away from them.
None of the lawyers or judges seemed to realize that the vulnerability 
of the consumer collateral to repossession in the case was as much due to 
grants by the furniture store of time extensions postponing the final pay-
ment due dates of the debts owing on the earlier purchases as it was to the 
pro rata payment application clause. They are simply two sides of the same 
coin. The replevin theory, which justified repossession of the merchandise 
by the furniture store, requires that ownership in the chattel remain with the 
seller until the buyer fully repays the purchase price, at which time title 
passes to the buyer. If there is a default in the payment stream, the contin-
ued possession of the chattel by the buyer becomes wrongful, and reposses-
sion or replevy becomes warranted. The reason that the full purchase price 
cannot be deemed to have been fully paid logically follows from the fact 
that the time for completing the payments on every purchased item was 
being continuously extended into the future with each new purchase. The 
consumers had the choice to pay off the early items before purchasing the 
later ones, but when offered the opportunity to extend the payment sched-
ules for the old purchases to the due dates of the new ones, they had to 
understand that they were postponing the event, full payment, which would 
result in a transfer of title to them. Supposing the contract had provided that 
payments would first be applied to the cloth chattels and only later to the 
metal ones, a clause which presumably would not be unconscionable per 
se. If under such an application clause, final due dates on all credit pur-
36. She might buy her washing machine on credit from another merchant and begin making two 
separate streams of payments, supposing that she can transfer her reputation as a reliable paying credit 
customer from one merchant to another without any additional transaction costs or delays. Such transac-
tion costs, which surely exist and are positive, would still diminish the value of the economic asset her 
past credit performance had generated in her former credit relationship. Technically an economist 
would conclude that the reputational asset was specialized to the particular seller.
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chases were nevertheless extended into the future when a new credit pur-
chase was made, replevin of all of the items would still have been warrant-
ed. It was the grant of extra time in which to complete paying, rather than 
the pro-rata application of payment clause, which kept the right to replevy 
alive. In that sense, then, the payment application scheme is independent of 
the time extension grant. If the contractual plan leaves all of the collateral 
subject to replevy because the time for full payment has been continuously 
extended into the future, and a future repossession of the earliest purchased 
items is unconscionable, the agreement extending the time for final pay-
ment for all the items is as culpable for the result as is the pro rata applica-
tion of payments clause. A doctrine that discourages credit sellers from 
granting additional time to welfare mothers for paying off their purchases 
also has unpleasant distributive overtones.
Perhaps the court felt a five-year extension of time to complete pay-
ing for her potholders so she could more easily make the payments on a 
new washing machine was so ungenerous that it was unconscionable, but
that sounds unlikely. A claim that the consumers did not really understand 
that they were postponing full payment for every item they had purchased 
and thus did not subjectively consent to the purchase terms is harder to 
credit than a claim that they simply did not understand a pro rata payment 
application clause. However, counsel for Walker-Thomas did not make this 
argument, and the D.C. Court of Appeals dismissed the failure of consent 
defense based on the duty of the buyer to read and understand his or her 
contracts before signing them.37
The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, seemed to credit the possibility 
that the store had not obtained true consent from the consumer to unfair 
terms and, if not, that a finding of lack of such consent could trigger an 
unconscionability inquiry:
Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its 
terms assumes the risk that he has entered into a one-sided bargain. But 
when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a 
commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its 
terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation 
of his consent, was ever given to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule 
that the terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should be aban-
37. Walker-Thomas, 198 A.2d at 916 (“We have stated that one who refrains from reading a 
contract and in conscious ignorance of its terms voluntarily assents thereto will not be relieved from his 
bad bargain.”).
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doned and the court should consider whether the terms of the agreement . 
are so unfair38 that enforcement should be withheld.39
IV. UNCONSCIONABILITY
Consumer counsel did not resort to the unconscionability defense at 
the trial or during its first losing appeal. The consumers resisted enforce-
ment of the pro rata clause on grounds which generally fall into two catego-
ries: First they claimed that consumers cannot be held to contract terms 
they say they never personally, understood, because true subjective con-
tractual intent is lacking. Second, they argued that the furniture company’s 
contract was void for violation of (some) public policy.40 To this list of 
classic (even if also classically unsuccessful) consumer defenses, however, 
the D.C. Circuit considered a new theory, based upon the then recent adop-
tion by Congress of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code appli-
cable to the District of Columbia, albeit with an effective date well after 
time of the trial of the case.41 They concluded that the application of pay-
ments clause in the contract need not be enforced because enforcement 
would be unconscionable under the newly enacted U.C.C. section 2-302.42
The D.C. Circuit, as a preliminary matter, also must have felt the tension 
between adopting the dangerously overbroad defensive theories of the con-
sumer appellants, and the desire to modify the purchase contracts so as to 
conform them to what consumers would expect or deem fair. Accordingly, 
the D.C. Circuit took the unusual step of appointing a prominent D.C. law-
yer as amicus curiae. The amicus submitted a brief devoted entirely to the 
application of the new unconscionability article, and the D.C. Circuit’s 
ultimate opinion tracked the recommendation of the amicus very closely.43
Appellants and amicus argued that unconscionability doctrine applied 
because the new U.C.C. simply restated the common law.44 Since the D.C. 
Circuit and the courts of the district were empowered to adopt common law 
doctrine effective in the district, and Congress had, in the prospective stat-
ute, indicated its policy preference that an unconscionability defense be 
38. That the D.C. Circuit thought the pro rata application clause, and not the time extension 
clause was the source of the unfairness can be inferred from the way it initially characterized the facts 
of the case in the opinion. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 
1965).
39. Id. at 450.
40. See Walker-Thomas, 198 A.2d at 915.
41. Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 448.
42. Id. at 447-48.
43. See generally Brief Amicus for Gerhard Van Arkel, id. (Nos. 18,604 & 18,605).
44. Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 449.
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adopted, the courts were free to recognize the defense in this case.45 One 
might have expected an argument analogizing replevin, an old common law 
writ46 which permits involuntary physical transfer of the possession of 
goods, with specific performance of a promise to permit repossession. A 
court recognizing the closeness of the analogy might exploit the occasion to 
expand the envelope of the ancient equity unconscionability doctrine to 
encompass replevin actions as well.
To summarize the case, the consumers obtained several different 
household goods at several different points in time from the appellee furni-
ture company on secured credit.47 After each credit purchase, the consum-
ers signed identical credit contracts, each of which provided for a single 
monthly payment not only to amortize the credit cost of the new purchase 
but also to reduce the unpaid balances remaining due on previous purchas-
es.48 The contract clauses provided that the single monthly installment 
payment made pursuant to the latest contract be applied to discharge that 
and all the previous multiple debts pro-rata.49 The merchant creditor had 
long distributed each payment among the multiple contracts in the propor-
tions the balances remaining due for each purchase bore to each other.50
Thus, no matter how many installment payments the consumer made, an 
unpaid balance remained due on every purchased item until the consumer 
paid off the aggregate debt on all items. Under the conditional sale theory 
employed at the time, then, the condition for title to pass for any of the 
purchased items would not occur until payment in full was made for all of
them, and thus all the objects would be subject to replevin (repossession) if 
the consumer defaulted on any part of the overall payment obligation.51
45. Id. (“In fact in view of the absence of prior authority on the point, we consider the congres-
sional adoption of Section 2-302 persuasive authority for following the rationale of the cases from 
which the section is explicitly derived.”) (footnote omitted).
46. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.17(1), at 917 (West Publishing Co. ed., 2d ed. 1933) 
(“In rare cases, the plaintiff might seek equitable relief to secure the return of a chattel. More common-
ly, the claim for recovery of the chattel was pursued at common law under forms of action such as 
detinue or replevin.”).
47. Actually, under lease-purchase contracts, which then existing law as well as Article 9 of the 
current U.C.C. re-characterizes it as a security interest. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
48. See infra Part III.A.
49. See Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 447; Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 
914, 915 (D.C. 1964).
50. Id.
51. The court might have noted that not only had the UCC sales of goods article, Art. 2, but also 
its secured transactions article, Art. 9 had been enacted by Congress, although with an effective date 
subsequent to the trial of these cases. By the same reasoning that enabled it to apply the provisions of 
article two, even though it had not yet become effective, the court might also have adopted the limita-
tions on repossession of collateral found in the newly enacted Art. 9. Under Art. 9, the secured party 
must dispose of the collateral in a commercial reasonable manner. For some of the earlier purchased 
items, the court then might have been able to conclude that disposing of the collateral could never have 
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The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found this pro-rata application of pay-
ment clause potentially unconscionable under the recently enacted (but at 
that time not yet effective) section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code,52 and therefore remanded for the lower court to make the ultimate 
determination.53 The case settled before the lower court could act on the 
remand so we have yet to discover whether or not pro-rata application of 
payments clauses are, in fact, unconscionable in the District of Columbia.
Common wisdom in consumer advocate circles nevertheless regards 
the issue the case remanded as completely settled despite the absence of a 
determination on remand. After the case, the National Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws drafted a Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1968),54
directing the application of payment strategy, urged by consumers’ counsel 
in Walker-Thomas, mandatory. For example:
§ 2.409. Debt Secured by Cross Collateral
(1) If debts arising from two or more consumer credit sales . . . are se-
cured by cross collateral (Section 2.408) or consolidated into one debt 
payable on a single schedule of payments, and the debt is secured by se-
curity interests taken with respect to one or more of the sales, payments 
received by the seller after the taking of the cross collateral or the con-
solidation are deemed, for the purpose of determining the amount of the 
debt secured by the various security interests, to have been first applied 
to the payment of the debts arising from the sales first made. To the ex-
tent debts are paid according to this section, security interests in items of 
property terminate as the debts originally incurred with respect to each 
item is paid.55
We consider below whether this application of payments strategy is 
actually likely to be in the interests of rational consumers in states that have 
adopted this mandatory clause for consumer credit contracts. Furthermore, 
for states not adopting this legislation, the study will argue that, prima fa-
cie, the Walker-Thomas clause was actually more in the interests of in-
been commercially reasonable, U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (2012), inasmuch as the cost of repossession and 
resale would have exceeded the amount recoverable.
52. Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d at 448.
53. Id. at 450.
54. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 1.101-9.103 (1968), adopted by seven states: Colorado,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-1-101 to 5-9.5-109 (West 1971); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-1-101 
to 24-4.5-7-414 (West 1971); Oklahoma, 14A OKLA STATS. ANN. §§ 1-101 to 9-101 (1969); South 
Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-101 to 37-6-415 (1976); Utah, U.C.A. 1953 70C-1-101 to 70C-9-
102 (1985); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 421.101 to 427.105 (1972); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40-14-101 to 40-14-702 (1971). A subsequent edition of this legislation, UNIFORM CONSUMER 
CREDIT CODE §§ 1.101-9.103 (1974) has an identical provision in Section 3.303. The 1974 version has 
been adopted in four other states: Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-41-101 to 28-49-107 (1983); Iowa, 
IOWA CODE §§ 537.1101 to 537.7103 (1974); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16a-1-101 to 16a-9-102 
(1973); and Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9, §§ 1-101 to 10-401 (1973).
55. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.409 (1968).
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stallment buyers than the default provisions of the law which at that time 
would have replaced the stricken Walker-Thomas provision, so that declar-
ing the Walker-Thomas provision unconscionable, and resorting to the de-
fault doctrine would have adversely affect rational credit consumers in 
those states. This analysis should also be of interest in light of the adoption 
by all states of the latest version of Article Nine of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code which authorizes courts to develop an entirely new default appli-
cation of payments doctrine insofar as the payments might apply to 
consumer debts secured by purchase money security interests.56
V. CONSUMER ASSETS: FINANCING OF CONSUMER PURCHASES
Why do consumers buy goods and how much do they value them? 
Conceptually, an asset owner has the exclusive right to the services of that 
asset over its useful life, and, accordingly, the present value of the asset to 
the owner is simply the discounted value of the stream of future services 
the asset is expected to provide, net of the discounted value of the stream of 
future other marginal costs it will be necessary to expend in order to obtain 
those services and the present worth of any future salvage value. These 
values and costs will vary by asset. Lawn mowers provide valuable ser-
vices by maintaining your landscape over their useful lives, but they do 
require the user to bear the costs of future gasoline, parts, and maintenance 
necessary to keep those services coming. This insight teaches that consum-
er asset purchases are partially consumptive and are partially investments. 
You will consume the first year of your lawn mower’s life during its first 
mowing season, but will have remaining the unspent values of the services 
it promises to provide over the coming growing seasons as well. Over the 
asset’s life, the initial purchase price will eventually convert from a future 
investment into a present consumption cost. Rational consumers will thus 
buy consumer goods whenever the discounted value they place on the as-
set’s services exceeds the value of the marginal consumer in the market 
(whose value determines the market price of mowers in a competitive mar-
ket), and the lower their internal discount rates, the more they will be will-
ing to pay.57
56. U.C.C. § 9-103(e)(h) (2012).
57. There is considerable opinion that many if not most consumers have so many cognitive 
deficiencies that they cannot be regarded even for policy purposes as rational. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, 
Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW U. L.REV. 1373 (2004); John A.E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless 
Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L.REV. 405 (2007). This is thought to be particularly true about their 
decisions to borrow in order to over consume what rational consumers might not have consumed. M. 
Keith Chen & Alan Schwartz, Intertemporal Choice and Legal Constraints, YALE LAW SCHOOL 
WORKING PAPER No. 381 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396333.
246 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:1
Consumers also face budget constraints on their ability to purchase as-
sets and thus control the future services those assets will provide. A rational 
consumer facing such constraints is thus likely to seek financing for the 
purchase. In any given period, if the value of the services the asset provides 
exceeds the sum of future costs and the amount due in installment pay-
ments, the consumer is made better off in each such period over the state of 
the world in which he cannot procure any financing and so must forego the 
services entirely. The issue raised in Walker-Thomas can thus be restated: 
Supposing a consumer has made a credit purchase in the past, will the op-
portunities to make future purchases still have value to that consumer? 
There is much in the law from which one can infer policy makers believe 
the answer is “yes.” The states which closely regulate consumer credit 
transactions by adopting the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, for example,
still encourage purchase money credit transactions by explicitly authorizing 
the pledge of any equity in collateral purchased on secured credit to secure 
the debt incurred in the purchase of that new item of consumer collateral.58
The FTC rule, which prohibits the taking of consumer goods as collateral 
for loans, permits taking consumer goods as collateral in such purchase 
money transactions.59 The Bankruptcy Code, permits debtors to avoid secu-
rity interests in exempt property, but withdraws that permission if the debt-
or created the security interest to obtain the collateral.60 Whether to 
prohibit a merchant from bargaining for favorable application of payment 
clauses in future credit contracts will thus have some social importance if 
the lost transactions would have been valued by the consumer. The judicial 
requirement that all payments in Ms. Williams’s case be credited entirely to 
the potholders and toys requires the furniture store to make delivery of the 
beds, kitchen chairs, and washing machine without being able to ask for a 
stream of payments to begin at the time of delivery for those items. The 
conscionable contract is thus likely to require the Ms. Williams of this 
world to completely pay off the earlier debts before the market will likely 
be willing to offer them future opportunities to acquire the services of new 
assets on credit. The more budget constrained the consumer, the longer the 
time of postponement necessitated and the larger the loss in consumer wel-
fare to budget constrained consumers.
58. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.408 (1968); id. § 3.303(1) (1974).
59. 16 C.F.R § 444.2 (2013).
60. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(B) (2012).
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A. Consumer Goods as Collateral
At the time of Ms. Williams’ transactions, it was permissible under the 
Uniform Commercial Code for consumers to pledge their household goods 
as collateral securing repayment of loans.61 In 1985, however, the Federal 
Trade Commission adopted a Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Credit 
Practices that prohibits the taking of a non-purchase-money security inter-
est in household goods.62 The fact that purchase money security interests 
are still encouraged both by state and federal law and regulations is power-
ful evidence that the services identified in the foregoing analysis are of 
significant value to consumers such that outlawing the credit acquisition of 
household goods via secured credit would be on balance harmful. It is also 
highly likely that the FTC Rule would not have affected either Ms. Wil-
liams or Mr. Thorne. The credit extended to them by the furniture store was 
entirely used to permit them to acquire the collateral, which makes the 
store’s security interests in their household goods purchase money security 
interests63 permitted by that rule.
Indeed, to the extent the application of payments clause worked to 
preserve the purchase money status of all of the store’s security interests 
under the then existing law, the clause served consumers very well. Under 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, purchase money security inter-
ests in consumer goods are “perfected” and thus made effective against 
some purchasers of the collateral as well as against other creditors of the 
debtors, without requiring the giving of public notice by the filing of a fi-
nancing statement.64 Were the security interests to lose their purchase 
money status, they would become unperfected unless the store were to pay 
a filing fee to file a financing statement describing the items involved in 
each specific secured transaction.65 It is likely that most, if not all of the 
extra filing fees, would have been passed along to the consumer, as are all 
the other costs of making the credit sales. Maintaining the purchase money 
character of the consumers’ security interests not only saves them from the 
FTC prohibition on using consumer goods as collateral, but also saves Ar-
61. That this preexisting result was the status changed by the application of 2-302 is implicit in 
the opinion of the D.C. Circuit. See also Dostert supra note 10, at 1185 (“We had transmitted the details 
of the Thorne case with the request that the conduct of Walker-Thomas Furniture Company be investi-
gated . . . The Commission concluded that after investigation of the case further action was not warrant-
ed.”).
62. 16 C.F.R § 444.2.
63. U.C.C. § 9-103(a), (b)(1) (2012).
64. U.C.C. § 9-309(1) (2012).
65. U.C.C. §§ 9-310(a), 9-516(a) (2012).
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ticle 9’s filing fees.66 Some doubt remains whether or not consolidating the 
debt incurred in purchasing the initial set of curtains with the later obliga-
tion to pay for the stereo, for example, caused the curtains to lose their 
status as purchase money collateral.67 In the Williams case, however, this 
may not have been significant, as the actual collateral repossessed did not 
include much of the earlier, arguably refinanced, collateral.68
B. Purchase Money Collateral
Whether or not the security interests created in the earliest collateral 
sold to Ms. Williams had been satisfied and discharged by her payments 
may have been irrelevant because most of the earlier purchased (and thus 
presumably “paid for”) collateral was not, in fact, actually repossessed.69
The court’s impulse to outlaw the contract payment application scheme 
might have its source in the rationale for which the FTC outlawed the use 
of household goods as (non-purchase-money) collateral.70 Household 
goods are subject to a significant problem of information asymmetry, 
which creates the well-known “lemons” problem.71 The consumer will 
likely be well informed about the condition and the history of any item of 
household goods used in the household. A repossessing creditor, and more 
particularly, a potential buyer at a foreclosure sale, on the other hand, will 
have very little information. To the extent that with any asset, information 
about its latent, difficult or expensive to observe feature might affect its 
66. One might hypothesize that only an initial filing fee might be required to perfect a security 
interest in all of the collateral if the initial filing simply describes the collateral for the filing as “current 
and future household goods purchased on credit from us,” or another similar generic categorical term. 
However, Article Nine itself will not give effect to after-acquired property clauses granting security 
interests in consumer goods, U.C.C. § 9-204(b)(1) (2012), and thus requires multiple separate future 
filings for each future consumer non-purchase money credit transaction. None of the courts or commen-
tators who have evaluated the Walker-Thomas contract strategy has noted that it saved substantial filing 
fees and thus might even be preferred by consumers when they were evaluating whether or not the 
scheme was unconscionable or not.
67. See JONATHAN SHELDON & ROBERT A. SABLE, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER,
REPOSSESSIONS §§ 3.4.1-3.4.4 (2d ed. 1988) (providing a detailed discussion the effects of loan consol-
idation). Many of the arguments in favor of loss of purchase money status were probably reinforced or 
preserved when the latest revision of article nine expanded the reach of purchase money status only in 
non-consumer goods transactions, leaving the final determination of that status up to future courts when 
consumer goods are collateral. U.C.C. § 9-103(f), (h) (2012).
68. Brief for Appellee, supra note 15, at 6 (“Of the items sought to be replevied, only the chest, 
folding bed, washing machine and stereo were recovered—the remaining chattels having been 
eloigned.”).
69. Id.
70. 16 C.F.R § 444.2 (2013); see also FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, ECONOMIC REPORT ON 
INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS (1968).
71. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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value, a rational potential buyer will protect itself against the possibility of 
unobserved but damaging qualities by lowering the amount it will bid to 
obtain the used item. Sellers of used merchandise can normally agree to 
protect potential buyers by offering an accurate description of the condition 
of the asset and backing up the accuracy of their description by issuing a 
warranty of that accuracy. In the case of repossessed household goods, 
however, the owners will not be issuing warranties as they are not the 
sellers of the goods, nor will the uninformed foreclosing secured party be 
able to guarantee their quality. Indeed, buyers of repossessed goods will
likely presume that some defect in the asset was among the causes of the 
default that led to the repossession and sale, and thus discount their bids at 
that sale accordingly.
The lemons problem means used, repossessed household goods likely 
have substantial but hard to credibly verify value to the debtor, but will 
bring only a heavily discounted recovery to the repossessing creditor. Since 
the losses to the consumer will thus outweigh the gains by the creditor, 
repossessions, and resales are economically inefficient viewed ex post. If 
so, preventing their occurrence (the effect of the FTC rule) can be justified 
on efficiency grounds. The loss from the repossession of an item of pur-
chase money collateral should be, in principle, the same as for non-
purchase-money collateral, but it is not forestalled by the FTC rule. The 
FTC may have reasoned that if they permitted the credit purchase of con-
sumer goods, the prospect of facing a lemons loss would motivate consum-
ers not to exercise the discretion they have to take actions that increase the 
risk of default. Since the gains to consumers empowered to finance pur-
chase money assets are so large, and the lowering of the costs of moral 
hazard to the creditor is so substantial, the joint gains to consumers and 
creditors from the many purchase money credit sales successfully paid for 
can be expected to outweigh the few losses from the repossession of pur-
chase money collateral for the few defaulters. Thus, the purchase money 
exception to the FTC rule can be explained. Whether benefit to other credi-
tors should be taken into account in deciding whether the repossession 
power is conscionable for any given debtor, however, raises a different 
issue. The existing cases do not address whether or not a clause which is 
harsh on Consumer A can be saved from unconscionability by virtue of its 
benefits to consumers B, C, D . . . N, however.
VI. MEASURING DEBTS AND COUNTING THEM
To begin framing the area of law to be governed by the payment doc-
trines in question, one must assume that something called multiple debts 
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exist which are addressed by single or partial payments. As soon as you flip 
on your electrical switch your electric meter begins to record a continuous 
increase in the debt you owe your power company. One might arbitrarily 
select some time period to be used in defining and measuring the size of a 
single debt, say a second’s worth of power, so that at the end of a minute 
with the lights on, you owe sixty debts of kilowatt-seconds each to the utili-
ty. Alternatively, one might similarly break down the amount owing by 
allocating various time periods to varying uses of the electricity. For two 
hours, the current powered a TV, for thirteen minutes the washing machine, 
and for ten a floor lamp, leaving you with a TV debt, a washing machine 
debt, and a floor lamp debt. Common law civil procedure ignored these 
possible ways of making many debts out of a series of borrowings or pur-
chases, however, by entertaining a cause of action “on an account stated” 
(or sometimes, an “account annexed” to the writ), one of the useful “com-
mon counts” of common law pleading.72 Individual purchases and install-
ment payments were simply ignored in that action and judgment awarded 
on the net balance due after debiting all of the charges and crediting all of 
the payments.73 This theory probably still dominates in the collection of 
many kinds of lines of credit transactions, from American Express cards to 
gasoline and department store cards and country store charge accounts, to 
hourly charges by lawyers for legal services. There is no reason to try to 
associate any part of the debt with the underlying transaction which created 
it, so to save transaction costs, the aggregated debt is treated as a single 
obligation, even if the amount of the debt is computed by summing up the 
total of numerous credit transactions or sales events.
When legal remedies begin to depend on the facts of an underlying 
transaction, on the other hand, then there is good reason to decompose the 
total debt into its component parts, since each part might give rise to a dif-
ferent remedy. When the total owed is summed from obligations bearing 
differing remedies, a conflict may arise between the borrower and the lend-
er. The borrower will prefer that all payments be applied to the debt bear-
ing the most onerous legal consequences, say for example those which bear 
the highest interest rates or permit the seizure of the most valuable collat-
eral,74 so that he is left, should circumstances necessitate an eventual de-
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 282 (1979).
73. Id.
74. Recall our previous theory that predicts credit sellers will not sell valuable items in its initial 
transactions, but rather delay extending that kind of credit only to borrowers who have acquired the 
reputation for being trustworthy payers. See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text. The most valua-
ble collateral, on that assumption, then is likely the latest to be acquired and the debt for which rational 
consumers want payments to apply first. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Ms. Williams 
2014] WALKER-THOMAS REVISITED 251
fault, facing an array of the least onerous remedial obligations, those, in the 
example, bearing lower rates or risking the loss only of the least valued 
collateral. For the same reason, the lender will desire the payments be first 
applied to the obligations bearing the least onerous remedies so that if de-
fault occurs, the debtor will face an array of the most seriously burdensome 
remedial duties. This prospect is likely to minimize moral hazard, the in-
centive of the debtor to default in the first place.
VII. THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSUMER DEBT REMEDY
The principle affect of any credit contract is that, ultimately, the bor-
rower agrees to subordinate all of his interests in his property or seizable 
assets to the interests of the seizing creditor.75 Why do creditors ask for and 
why do debtors grant such subordinations? The debt contract itself is a 
product of information asymmetry. At the time of extending credit, the 
creditor knows that there is a possibility the debt will not be repaid. Future 
defaults can be categorized into two classes.
First, the circumstances leading to the default may be endogenous to 
the debtor, or explained by decisions the debtor makes and actions he takes 
within his or her control. It would be prohibitive to spell out in a credit 
contract how the debtor agrees to make all of his or her life decisions after 
the grant of the credit so as to minimize the risk that those post-credit deci-
sions and actions might necessitate a default on the debt. Consequently, 
credit contracts do not constrain debtor behaviors very explicitly, and thus 
grant them considerable discretion in how they can conduct their lives. This 
discretion gives rise to a significant economic transaction cost which econ-
omists label “moral hazard.” The debtor will be empowered by the discre-
tion left him in the credit contract to make many life decisions and to 
engage in many life activities without taking into account the possibility 
that those decisions and activities might result in an eventual loss to the 
creditor. As an example, the debtor may resign from an unpleasant job, 
risking that new and more pleasant substitute employment can be quickly 
obtained. When the risk that the substitute employment will not be quickly 
offered materializes, one result may be default by the debtor in her mort-
gage payments. More commonly, the debtor might decide to spend money 
may have preferred to give up her potholders and keep her washing machine, the result made least 
likely by a FIFO application of payments requirement.
75. This argument needs to be qualified to the extent the state exempts certain assets from credi-
tor seizure, as all states do, but it nevertheless does apply to nonexempt assets. See James W. Bowers, 
Security Interests, Creditors’ Priorities, and Bankruptcy, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, 270-272 (Boudewijn Bouckaert ed., 2nd ed. 2010).
252 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:1
on some other activity when the expenditure increases the risk that the 
debtor will be too illiquid to make the monthly payment that becomes due 
after the expenditure.
The second category of causes of debtor default may be classified as 
exogenous or general forces that will act on all debtors. The business cycle 
might enter into its periodic declining phase and the debtor might suffer 
unemployment resulting from the shrinkage in employment generally. Fre-
quently, since exogenous causes for default are, by definition beyond the 
control of the parties, the most efficient technique for dealing with them is 
to engage in some kind of insuring or loss spreading strategy. In the case of 
merchant/consumer credit contracts, there is good reason to suspect that the 
party with the better loss spreading opportunities will be the merchant. On 
this basis, one might expect to find allocations of risk in credit contracts 
that address possible endogenous risks of default and assign them to the 
consumer debtor, and which likewise define the exogenous risks and assign 
them to the merchant creditor.
In fact, consumer contracts that classify and assign risks along these 
lines are infrequent if nonexistent. Partly this is because the categorical 
border between those causes of default is a fuzzy line. The economy may 
become difficult, but the default probability may still be affected by the 
debtor’s ability or willingness to anticipate and adjust to the possibility of 
that difficulty. Thus, even exogenous causes of default may have a large 
endogenous component. The endogenous category of causes of payment 
default is thus likely the more important of the two categories of causes. 
Efficient contracts are likely to assign risks endogenous to a party to that 
party.76 Because the risk or large portions of them fall within his control, 
the contractual placing of those risks upon him generates an efficient incen-
tive for him to use his power to control to protect not only himself but the 
creditor as well. The stronger those incentives to behave in ways which 
minimize the prospect that losses will be suffered by the creditor the lower 
the cost of the moral hazard inherent in the debtor/creditor relationship, and 
presumably, the lower the cost of credit to the consumer.
The uninformed creditor is also naturally concerned that the debtor 
has maximal incentives to avoid defaulting, but is aware that rational debt-
ors will resist repaying once the goods have been delivered or the loan 
disbursed.77 The debtor’s promise to repay, thus, is not a credible promise 
76. Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 
2018-19 (1987).
77. Arthur Allen Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite – The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 
YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1970) (“Under the American Law of Contracts, after the other party has fully performed 
his obligations, it is absolutely irrational for you to perform yours.”).
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unless accompanied by an offer to subordinate to the creditor in the event 
of nonrepayment. The default understanding of any debt obligation is that 
the debtor has agreed to subordinate his rights to any of his assets to the 
creditor in the event of default. Nonrecourse contracts are the exception, 
not the rule.
VIII. THE MECHANISMS OF DEBTOR SUBORDINATION
Agreeing to subordinate is an expensive proposition for a debtor. One 
imagines the creditor showing up at the debtor’s place after a default and 
selecting the most dearly loved or valuable of the debtor’s assets. This pro-
spect provides a powerful incentive not to default in the first instance, of 
course, and the agreement to risk this adverse consequence in the event of 
default adds great credibility to the debtor’s expression of willingness to 
repay. The default subordination agreement provides a significant bonding 
function between the debtor and the creditor. The interest that lenders show 
in what assets the debtor owns is similarly explained. A promise to subor-
dinate my interest in an asset to your claim is highly sensitive to the quali-
ties of the asset.
In addition, the default subordination policy is subject to some signifi-
cant limitations. Creditors may not simply appear and take what they want; 
instead, they are required in the first instance to give due process to the 
debtor. The subordination that takes place occurs only when sheriffs or 
marshals seize assets collecting judgments or when assets are sold at legal-
ly authorized non-judicial sales. During the time it takes the creditor to sue 
and obtain judgment against the debtor, the debtor can select which, among 
their collection of assets, are least valuable to them, liquidate those assets, 
and use the proceeds to pay off the debt.78 Every jurisdiction also provides 
protection to particular types of assets which are likely to be very valuable 
to debtors but not to creditors by exempting them from seizures.79
Debtors can influence creditor choices of assets to seize, and accord-
ingly the choice of which assets in which to be subordinated, by granting 
security interests in them to other creditors. The expense of disentangling 
78. See generally Bowers, supra note 75.
79. ELIZABETH WARREN AND JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 169 (5th ed. 2006) (“The law in every state makes at least some property exempt from 
execution and other legal process so that no debtor can be reduced to absolute destitution.”). At least 
one state permits the debtor to select the assets in which he will be subordinate ex post by permitting 
him to select which assets the sheriff must seize first. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.003 (2011) 
(“DESIGNATION OF EXEMPT PROPERTY. (a) . . .If the number or amount of a type of personal 
property owned by a debtor exceeds the exemption allowed by Section 42.002 and the debtor can be 
found in the county where the property is located, the officer making a levy on the property shall ask 
the debtor to designate the personal property to be levied on.”).
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the interest of the secured creditor from the interest being seized causes 
creditors to prefer seizing unencumbered assets first.80 Thus, the law per-
mitting the creation of security interests can be explained, in part, as a de-
vice to efficiently select the assets in which the debtor will be subordinat-
subordinating to his other creditors,81 just as the debt contract under which 
the agreement to subordinate occurs can be justified as a device to lower 
the transactional costs that moral hazard imposes on lenders and borrowers.
IX. CONSUMER PREFERRED APPLICATIONS OF PAYMENT
Initially, consumer preferences about which among multiple debts will 
be satisfied by any payment need to be subdivided into two temporal cate-
gories, ex ante and ex post.
A. Ex Ante: The Impact of Statutes of Limitation
Is there any reason why a debtor will care which of a series of future 
but yet to be incurred unsecured debts will be discharged by future pay-
ments? Arguably, there is for a single reason, the passage of time, and the 
running of statutes of limitations. Ceteris paribus, a hypothetical rational 
debtor will prefer to have all payments credited to the latest debts first, 
leaving unpaid only those about to be rendered unenforceable by the pas-
sage of time.82 This economic inference makes the strategy pursued by 
consumers’ counsel in Williams, to establish that consumers desire to have 
installment payments first amortize the early debts, at minimum unin-
formed if not irrational.83
On the other hand, if there is some possibility that the future credit 
transactions will involve the granting of security interests, the rational 
80. For a detail elaboration on this point James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Mur-
phy’s Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 
57-67 (1991).
81. Although the FTC rule that prohibits consumers from using security interests in their consum-
er goods could be judged, on this ground, inefficient for consumers. See supra notes 69-75 and accom-
panying text.
82. Recall for example that the course of dealing between the consumers in Williams took place 
over a five-year period while the statute of limitation for causes of action arising under contracts for the
sale of goods under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code is four years. See U.C.C. § 2-725 
(2012). Probably, however, the continuing extension of time in which to pay the early debts would tend 
to keep them renewed and within the four year period.
83. Interestingly enough, however, the eight states adopting the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
have mandated that payments on multiple debts must be applied to the oldest purchases first, and that 
once that debt has been completely amortized, any security interest in the asset must then terminate. 
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.303 (1974). Non-uniform Retail Installment Acts in other states 
often provide analogous regulation. See SHELDON & SABLE, supra note 67, at 87 n.266 (collecting 
citations).
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debtor also has an ex ante preference for being able to speculate against the 
creditor by being permitted to select, ex post, which debts previous pay-
ments will be deemed to have discharged. This provision permits him to 
select ex post to have payments applied to those debts secured only by the 
most valuable collateral, limiting the creditor’s foreclosure rights to only 
that collateral which, after the fact, is known to have the least value. If the 
market value of an asset serving as collateral rises, the debtor can thus cap-
ture the increase, and likewise impose the losses in collateral whose value 
has declined on the creditor.
Had the furniture store credit contracts not contained the clause direct-
ing how single payments would be applied to multiple obligations, but 
remained silent on the matter, debtors would have the right to designate the 
application of each payment ex post, as the payment is made under the 
existing default contract doctrine which governs in the absence of a contra-
ry agreement. The default doctrine is laid out in sections 258 through 260 
of the Restatement (2d) of Contracts:
§ 258. Obligor’s Direction of Application:
(1) [A]s between two or more contractual duties owed by an obligor to 
the same obligee, a performance is applied according to a direction made 
by the obligor to the obligee at or before the time of performance.84
Since this default doctrine for the application of payments permits 
debtors to effectively speculate against lenders ex post, lenders should be 
reluctant to enter into credit arrangements which do not provide for an 
agreed application ex ante rather than overlooking the problem and relying 
on the default doctrine to resolve any future questions. Some incentive like 
this undoubtedly explains the presence of the application of payments 
clause in the Walker-Thomas furniture store credit contracts.
Once the application of payments clause is stricken from the credit 
contract on unconscionability grounds, however, the contract is left with a 
default term which permits the debtor to engage in ex post speculation 
against the creditor, putting debtors into a “heads I win, tails you lose” 
posture. The interesting question is, however, given this power by the de-
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 258-260 (1981). A similar plan is adopted by the 
Uniform Commercial Code, but only for non-consumer goods transactions, U.C.C. § 9-103(e) (2012):
[Application of payment in non-consumer-goods transactions.] In a transaction other than 
a consumer-goods-transaction, if the extent to which a security interest is a purchase-money 
security interest depends on the application of a payment to a particular obligation, the pay-
ment must be applied:
(1) in accordance with any reasonable method of application to which the parties agree;
(2) in the absence of the parties’ agreement to a reasonable method in accordance with 
any intention of the obligor manifested at or before the time of payment . . . .
Id.
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fault application of payments doctrine, consumers freed from having to 
comply with a contracted-for application of payments scheme will in fact 
be able and willing to include a specific payment application direction with 
every monthly check. Given their testimony that they believed the pay-
ments would be applied “first-in, first out” it is unlikely that either consum-
er in Williams made the authorized default directive at the times they made 
their payments. If a consumer overlooks the opportunity to make that direc-
tion with the payment in any month, the default regime then shifts from one 
of debtor choice to one of creditor choice.
Restatement of Contracts (2d) § 259:
(1) [I]f the debtor has not directed application of a payment as between 
two or more matured debts the payment is applied according to a mani-
festation of intention made within a reasonable time by the creditor to the 
debtor.85
It seems reasonable to believe that as between a consumer who over-
looked the giving of a payment direction and a professional merchant, the 
latter is more likely to be aware of the importance of exercising the power 
to make such a direction, and to use it to apply payments in the manner 
most favorable to the merchant and least favorable to the consumer. The 
parties’ briefs do not consider whether the appealing consumers made ap-
plication directions when they delivered their payments, which leads one to 
suspect that Ms. Williams and the Thornes did not do so. On the other 
hand, the furniture store’s appellate brief asserts that because the store gave 
receipts to the consumer for every payment that might have manifested the 
store’s intent to apply the payment pro-rata, in accordance with the contract 
clause.86 There is also no evidence to the effect that either consumer ob-
jected to any application actually made by the creditor. In short, eliminating 
the pro rata clause from the credit contracts as the Williams decision seems 
to contemplate is likely to place consumers into a default regime in which 
they are unlikely to take the protective steps of making application direc-
tions, and consequently being left vulnerable to an application decision 
which permits the creditor to speculate against them. Indeed, however, in 
the Williams and Thorne cases the store did not exploit this opportunity. 
Instead, the store gave notice by issuing a receipt at the time of each pay-
ment that it would apply the payment pro rata to all debts. Striking the pro 
rata clause from the contracts and throwing the parties back into the general 
default regime would produce the same outcome the clause produced in 
states not adopting the U.C.C.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 259 (1981).
86. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 15, at 24-27.
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B. Ex post: The Impact of Depreciation
Contracts that contain agreed upon methods for applying future pay-
ments to multiple debts almost always by definition represent the exercise 
of ex ante choices.87 Systematically, there is one other fact of economic life 
that might influence the ex ante preferences of a debtor for application of 
any future payments among a series of secured debts. That fact of life is the 
existence of real economic depreciation. All other things equal, an older 
piece of collateral is likely to be worth less than a newer one, and hence 
less valuable. That too leads the debtor to prefer a last-in-first-out applica-
tion of payments, discharging as much debt on the newer more valuable 
assets first, and leaving the creditor with only the older, less valuable de-
preciated collateral. Correlatively, the creditor will have the exact contrary 
set of preferences, preferring the payments to be credited against the heavi-
ly depreciated property, leaving only the newer undepreciated assets avail-
able when the creditor has to resort to default remedies. The effect of the 
existence of real economic depreciation on the application of payments 
preferences in merchant/consumer contracts, however, is muddied by the
fact that the preferences being provided for will be the result of future 
transactions. A consumer can protect against the risk of being left with only 
depreciated collateral at the time of default by refusing to make credit sales 
of rapidly depreciating property in the first instance. If the debtor could 
validly agree to apply payments in such a way as to leave undepreciated 
property vulnerable to seizure upon the happening of a default, the mer-
chant may be willing to make the future credit transaction. On the other 
hand, if the only conscionable contract term which the court will enforce 
leaves the merchant with collateral of low or zero depreciated value, the 
credit sales will not take place. We have already determined that value to 
consumers of the opportunity to conduct purchase money acquisitions of 
consumer goods seems to be both recognized by the existing law and eco-
nomic theory. That value, however, would likely be heavily discounted or 
even lost in a regime that mandates the payment application exclusively to 
the most heavily depreciated assets first. Notably, this general theory of 
how consumers would prefer to have their payments applied is completely 
opposed to the applications prayed for by the consumer lawyers in the Wil-
liams case, and adopted by the states enacting the UCCC, or installment 
87. Note that only one contract terms in the Williams cases is disclosed or discussed in the courts’
opinions, probably due to the above discussed litigation strategies of the parties. However, the reasona-
ble assumption from the facts we do know is that some of the impact of the terms of the successive 
contracts the consumers signed, particularly the terms which extend the payment amounts and deadlines 
would be, with respect to the initiation of the merchant/consumer relationship, ex post.
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loan acts requiring payments applied to the oldest debts first, not only be-
cause the oldest debts will be for the least valuable collateral for consumers 
without established credit reputations, but also because the first items pur-
chased will have depreciated the most.
X. CONCLUSION
This study has argued that consumers on the edge of poverty will not 
be initially permitted by credit sellers to buy valuable assets on credit. In-
stead, rational credit sellers will transact initially primarily through sales of 
consumer goods which do not have high value to the customer, but the loss 
of which poses a low risk of loss to the credit seller. Poor consumers will 
be enabled by markets to buy valuable assets which provide them valuable 
and long-lived services, but only after they have built up a strong reputa-
tional asset as reliable debt payers. In Williams, the seminal opinion which 
launched the modern unconscionability doctrine, the D.C. Circuit blessed a 
theory which might have protected the consumer’s established reputation 
by applying his payments to debts incurred to acquire valuable assets, but 
instead dictated that those payments be applied to the purchase of the earli-
est purchased and thus least valuable assets. The court’s opinion, which 
invited the trial court on remand to adopt the theory of the defending legal 
aid society counsel to grant the consumer ownership of the used curtains 
but to potentially deny her ownership of the washing machine, cannot be 
credited with representing the interests of rational consumers facing bind-
ing budget constraints. It reduces the value to them of using their curtain 
contract to develop a valuable reputational asset so that eventually they 
could hope to obtain a continuing stream of services from a washing ma-
chine with seller financing.
Finally, the study also argues there are additional reasons why con-
sumers would likely prefer to have their property interests protected in the 
last purchased collateral, in addition to the argument based on the equilib-
rium struck between a credit seller and a high risk credit buyer in a series of 
purchases. First, application of payment to the latest debt in time increases 
the likelihood that the passage of time will operate to convey interests in 
the earlier purchases to the buyers. In the case of knowledgeable sellers, the 
potential advantage is admittedly small. Sophisticated sellers will manage 
in their later contracts to obtain waivers of statutes of limitation, perhaps at 
the addition of some transaction costs which themselves might be passed 
back to buyers.
Nevertheless, there is a final reason consumer buyers would probably 
prefer that payments be applied to their latest purchases first. Most con-
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sumer assets are rapidly depreciating so that, ceteris paribas, the payment 
application scheme would result in the consumer obtaining ownership of 
the least depreciated and therefore most valuable items in his or her collec-
tion. The payment scheme mandated by consumer statutes based on the 
Williams case, on the other hand, requires that the payments retire the debt 
and thus confer complete ownership to the buyer on the least valuable, 
most depreciated assets first.
If these conclusions are defensible, a mystery arises. Why did the fur-
niture store itself not bargain to have payments applied to the earliest pur-
chases first? By hypothesis, the store had bargaining power sufficient to 
obtain terms that were maximally unfavorable to consumer buyers, and in 
Williams, both buyers testified that they understood, and even preferred, 
the first in time payment application scheme. The pro rata payment applica-
tion formula is favorable to buyers who contemplate the benefits of making 
a series of purchases because each new purchase extends the time limits for 
paying off of earlier ones. The first contract in which the offending clause 
was found would not have been unfavorable to the consumer, as there 
would have been no other debts to which payments might be applied, pro 
rata or otherwise.
Moreover, recall that Section 2-306 measures unconscionability ex 
ante, from the time of the formation of the contract.88 From the standpoint 
of the time of the first contract, the pro rata clause had only a contingent 
potential effect. It would operate only in the event that the consumer made 
later purchases from the same merchant. When the later purchase is made 
the pro rata clause in the second contract operates to postpone final payoff 
of the debt from the first and from the second contract. How much it does 
so, however, is partially a function of the level of the newly agreed-to 
monthly payment. If the new payment level is high enough, the early debt 
might be paid off at the time it was originally scheduled to be paid so that a 
consumer expecting to own the potholders in July 1970 might in fact own 
them then, subject to another contingency: that the consumer does not de-
fault on the new level of payments. Since we cannot determine at the time 
of the second contract whether or not a future default will occur, it is diffi-
cult to conclude that the second contract is unconscionable at the time it 
was made. On the other hand, if the second contract does not set the new 
payment level at a high enough level to guarantee that the total debt will be 
88. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2012) (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of 
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so 
limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.”) (emphasis 
added).
260 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:1
paid off by the time the debt on the first purchase was scheduled to be paid 
off, the second contract ipso facto must contain an assent from the debtor to 
postpone and extend the due date for the payoff of the earlier debt. A con-
sensual postponement of the ownership date between the merchant and the 
consumer is harder to characterize as unconscionable, particularly if looked 
at from the time the second contract was made. The customer wished to 
extend the time until the first purchase is completely paid for and wished to 
postpone the occurrence of that event to enable her to acquire a more valu-
able asset and to exploit the new relational capital her payment history had 
produced.
Finally, the biggest mystery in the case is why neither counsel nor any 
of the courts was able to recognize that the contract term upon which they 
were focusing could be explained by a typical appreciation of contracting 
parties in installment credit cases that an application of payment problem 
might arise. The furniture store could have simply omitted the clause being 
objected to and relied upon the background contract rule for payment ap-
plication. If the store guessed that consumers would be unaware of their 
default option to choose how their payments were to be applied ex post, 
they might have gained the right to make the ex post designation them-
selves. In all likelihood, they were prepared to do so since they gave notice 
of the pro rata application after receipt of each payment. That they probably 
had the opportunity to use their power under the default rules for applica-
tion of payments to speculate against the consumers ex post, but chose 
instead to abide by a pro rata scheme which was less favorable to them than 
the default rule regime is strong evidence that they were not motivated to 
extract all the advantages the law might have granted them, but rather were 
willing to abide by an arrangement which postponed the due dates for old 
debts, and accordingly kept those debts open and unpaid longer than initial-
ly contemplated. The benefits of the time extensions, one must surmise, 
were worth so much to the consumers that they were likely to make future 
purchases from the same merchant in order to capture them. Those benefits 
may have disappeared, however, for consumers in the District of Columbia 
as a result of the holding in the case. Focus on creating broad idealistic 
legal precedent by the legal aid lawyers distracted them from attending to 
the factual patterns in their own clients’ cases. Their failure to realize how 
markets, even in impoverished areas, create opportunities for the poor to 
develop relational capital with their vendors, which eventually allows them 
to acquire valuable assets on credit, led them to seek a judicial doctrine 
likely to impair that market function, harming not only their specific cli-
ents, but also the clients for whom they took implicit responsibility for by 
seeking the kind of ruling they did. The common law legal tradition that 
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urges lawyers to represent their individual clients by attending closely to 
the facts in their cases is strengthened once this kind of case is realized to 
be a counter example.
There may be many consumers unhappy with the market options they 
have. It may stem from their desire to avoid charges based on the historical 
risk profile, or from the harshness of the remedies, the merchants bargain 
for, which tend to reduce those risks. In spite of such unhappiness, citizens 
living with liquidity constraints are actively seeking credit devices, which 
this symposium defines as “aberrant,” demonstrating the value of these 
grants of credit to illiquid consumers. No studies ask whether, given the 
budget constraints consumers faced at the time they made purchases, they 
would have preferred no extension of credit over expensive credit. For one 
thing, it is difficult to locate and survey persons who thought about buying 
and decided not to, even though that option is always available. By defin-
ing the objectionable credit devices as aberrant, the law would tend to make 
them unavailable. Even poor people are able to finance the purchase of 
assets, which deliver a stream of valuable future services to them. Legally 
eliminating these expensive credit devices homogenizes all consumers into 
stereotypes of the unhappy consumer who does not value having the bene-
fits any of these devices confer. That may not be an accurate characteriza-
tion of our economy’s consumers. Contract law owes its social value to 
permitting persons with heterogeneous tastes, wants, and aspirations to 
fulfill them in contracts suitable for the market conditions they face. The 
devices under scrutiny here may in fact meet many important needs of poor 
consumers. Calling them aberrant in order to outlaw them requires us to 
find ways of accommodating consumer heterogeneity. As of now, no one 
has sought to develop a solution for this problem. The traditional applica-
tion of payments doctrine seemed to accommodate those needs. The diffi-
culty with a mandatory “first payment applies to first debt” solution is that 
it leaves us in the dark about why the term must be mandatory and what 
kinds of payment application procedures will ever pass muster. For easy to 
understand reasons having to do with the short life spans of personal prop-
erty, it also takes away the consumer’s first option, which is to contract for 
the right to designate the application of every payment. Without that option 
to develop the value of her credit reputation in order to eventually obtain 
the services of the assets she wants, Ms. Williams will be stuck having to 
pay in full for her napkins but disabled from developing the value of her
reputation in order to buy her washing machine.

